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Abstract 
Social innovation is often conceived as a unifying policy concept around which cross-sectoral 
stakeholders can coalesce and organise. The emphasis placed on ‘new’ and ‘novel’ approaches to 
social problems is presented as a departure from established modes of thinking and action that 
transcend existing political and socio-economic divisions. Rather than focusing on the alignment, 
complementarity or institutional hybridity through which support for social innovation is procured, 
it is important to consider the tensions that are avoided, accommodated and ignored in the social 
innovation policymaking process. To do so, this brief working paper examines the (a)political 
character of social innovation policy in Europe and what implications this has for affecting socio-
structural change and power relations to tackle marginalisation. The purportedly cohesive 
conception and pursuit of social innovation across policy domains and structural levels, obscures 
from the fact that social innovation is a nested micro paradigm within the prevailing European 
political economy. A transference or realignment of power towards the powerless is central to the 
political project of social innovation in Europe. Without it, social innovation policymaking garners 
and gives credence to a conciliatory politics of need provision that focuses on ‘pragmatic solutions’ 
to ‘political problems’ regarding the redistribution of resource, power and opportunity.  
** 
Despite its essentially contested character and utility, social innovation is an increasingly popular 
policy concept that is drawn upon by a variety of cross-sectoral and partisan stakeholders at a range 
of socio-structural levels (Sinclair and Baglioni, 2014; Ayob et al., 2016). Whether conceived as a 
public service reform agenda; strategy for economic growth; policy approach to civic social 
renewal; or all of the above, it is uncharacteristically well-received and supported by political 
administrations across Europe given its relatively nascent status and salience. It’s ostensible 
capacity to generate political and policy consensus lies in its diffuse and indefinite character as an 
essentially (and perhaps necessarily) contested, or rather collaborative concept (Gallie, 1956; 
Ziegler, 2015). The varied motivations and applications encouraging interest in social innovation 
are considered to be one of its key assets and strengths in mobilising resources towards addressing 
societal challenges across Europe (European Commission, 2013). 
This is largely due to the positive inflection and treatment social innovation receives in the 
policymaking process across Europe (Evers et al., 2014). Within political and policy discourse, 
social innovation is presented as an opportunity to ‘improve’ outcomes and opportunities in a way 
that positively affects social dynamics and outcomes (Mulgan et al., 2007; Phills, 2008). Based on 
analysis undertaken as part of the CRESSI research project, it is clear that social innovation policy, 
                                                          
 
1 Edmiston, D. (2016) The (A)Politics of Social Innovation Policy in Europe: Implications for Socio-
structural Change and Power Relations, CRESSI Working Paper Series No.32/2016. Oxford: University of 
Oxford. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CRESSI Working Paper no. 32/2016      Page 2 | 9 
The (A)Politics of Social Innovation Policy in Europe: Implications for  
Socio-structural Change and Power Relations (23 December 2016) 
 
including its origins, operation and effects, is contextually and historically contingent (Edmiston, 
2015b; Edmiston and Aro, 2016). The policy concept of social innovation invariably intersects with 
established institutional logics that mediate its significance, salience and efficacy in mobilising 
networks of resource and action to tackle marginalisation. In this respect, the heterogeneity of goals, 
activities and outcomes supported through social innovation belie its purported coherence and 
unanimity as a policy objective at the EU and domestic level. 
As argued elsewhere in the CRESSI research project, social innovation entails ‘the development 
and delivery of new ideas and solutions… at different socio-structural levels that intentionally seek 
to change power relations and improve human capabilities’ (Nicholls and Ziegler, 2014: 2). Social 
innovation is often conceived as a unifying policy concept around which diverse stakeholders can 
coalesce and organise. The emphasis placed on ‘new’ and ‘novel’ approaches to social problems is 
presented as a departure from established modes of thinking and action that transcend existing 
political and socio-economic divisions. However, effective measures to foster social innovation 
require political, economic and social transformations that realign or displace existing power 
relations and socio-structural dynamics. In certain instances, this can (and perhaps should) generate 
conflicts between the differing operational functions and ideological interests underpinning social 
innovation. For example, measures that pursue some degree of social innovation may not 
necessarily cohere with strategies for economic growth or support the role of the welfare state in 
need provision (Brandsen, 2014).  
With this in mind, rather than focusing on the alignment, complementarity or institutional hybridity 
through which support for social innovation is procured, it is important to consider the tensions that 
are avoided, accommodated and ignored in the social innovation policymaking process. To do so, 
this brief working paper examines the (a)political character of social innovation policy in Europe 
and what implications this has for positively affecting socio-structural change and power relations 
to tackle marginalisation.  
To varying degrees, social innovation policies at the EU and domestic level exhibit a tendency to 
operate within the established confines and power relations of the institutional centre. The value and 
role of social innovation in European public policy is often instrumentally conceived in a manner 
that aligns (or at least does not jolt too strongly) with the existing socio-political and economic 
settlement of a given institutional context. As a result, European public policies as and for social 
innovation seem predisposed to institutional and cognitive capture that limits their transformative 
potential (Edmiston, 2015a; von Jacobi et al., 2017).  
In seeking to identify how policy might best foster disruptive social innovation, public bodies are 
faced with a perennial challenge: how to unsettle and destabilise the institutional dominance upon 
which, thus far, publicly-sponsored social innovation has been so greatly dependent. That is, how to 
mobilise resource and activity that is essentially systemic without compromising the means and 
ends from which social innovation derives its value.  
Examination of EU and domestic contexts suggests that, despite a plurality of applications and 
motivations, public policy agendas supporting social innovation rely upon and exploit hybrid 
networks of power that risk reproducing, rather than altering existing socio-structural relations 
(Mann, 1986). From this, it is possible to understand how social innovation as a policy paradigm is 
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situated within broader regimes of power that can either serve to stifle or enable its potential. 
Nicholls and Teasdale (2016) examine the interrelation between different policy fields to explore 
the significance of social enterprise as a policy paradigm in England and the extent of continuity 
and change observed over time. They argue that the micro-paradigm of social enterprise is nested 
within a meso paradigm linked to the mixed economy of welfare, which is, in turn, nested within a 
‘neoliberal’ macro-paradigm. As a micro paradigm: 
‘the framework of cognitive and normative ideas behind social enterprise policies 
were clearly nested within, and shaped by, the ideational material cascading down 
from the neoliberal macro-paradigm. Ideational changes at the level of the micro-
paradigm were not Kuhnian shifts, but rather an accommodation of normative 
differences between political parties within a coherent overall paradigmatic 
framework’ (Nicholls and Teasdale, 2016: 15). 
 
Similarly, bi-partisan and cross-sectoral interest in social innovation as a policy paradigm operates 
within a broader macro-economic and political framework. However, contrary to policy treatment 
of social enterprises as ‘nested’ at the micro level, political and policy discourse presents social 
innovation as a transversal policy paradigm and opportunity to address the mobilisation of resources 
and activity at the macro, meso and micro level.  
Particularly at the EU level, the policy paradigm of social innovation emerged from a recognition of 
the need to address structural factors in a manner that could contribute towards ‘smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth’ (European Commission, 2015). Whilst the systems of power that structure 
inequality and marginalisation are problematized within such a framing, the utility and application 
of social innovation in public policymaking is conceived and supported in minimalist and 
revisionist ways at the micro-level.  
Figure 1: Social innovation as a transversal and nested policy paradigm 
 
Source: Adapted from Nicholls and Teasdale (2016) 
In spite of the rhetoric, this excludes meso questions concerning the role of the market economy in 
need provision. Equally, it distracts from the increasingly reductionist approach taken to welfare 
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state spending and assistance that characterises a great deal of European public service reform 
(Edmiston, 2014). The purportedly cohesive conception and pursuit of social innovation across 
policy domains and structural levels, obscures from the fact that social innovation is, in reality, a 
nested micro paradigm within the prevailing European political economy. Whilst it has more 
recently been used to reenergise other micro paradigms (e.g. social enterprise), and re-frame meso 
paradigms surrounding welfare provision, social innovation public policymaking overwhelmingly 
operates in a way that aligns with and legitimises the existing neoliberal socio-economic and 
political settlement. This tendency within social innovation policymaking can be understood as a 
process of ‘centralised decentralisation’ in the mixed economy of welfare that reflects a reluctance 
to unsettle and displace the institutional dominance that structures marginality (Edmiston and Aro, 
2016). In this respect, social innovation can be understood as an applied policy idea that is 
embedded within fundamental assumptions that form the prevailing policy paradigm and policy 
options available (Béland, 2005). Invariably, this dominant policy framework shapes and constrains 
debated policy alternatives and the ends towards which social innovation as a policy concept is put. 
This reflects a broader instrumentalisation of need provision, which EU social innovation policy 
operates within and, in certain instances, contributes towards (Grisolia and Ferragina, 2015). 
Within the policymaking process, the power to identify, define and address societal challenges 
tends to lie at the political and institutional centre. Examination of EU and domestic social 
innovation policy suggests this has significant implications (and limitations) for addressing socio-
structural disadvantage (Edmiston, 2015a; Edmiston and Aro, 2016; von Jacobi et al., 2017). For 
example, work integration social enterprises are often presented as a public policy initiative to 
foster social innovation. Policies and funding to support work integration social enterprises give 
legitimation to and shape wider perception of institutions whilst also shifting cognitive frames 
associated with unemployment and disadvantage. In addition, social innovation policymaking tends 
to encourage and support stronger networks of coordination between the public, private and third 
sectors. As an ancillary objective, these networks of collaboration are put towards a variety of ends. 
Central to these policy initiatives is an attempt to influence the structure, perceptions and capacity 
of social networks within the social economy. Overall, EU and domestic public policies have 
supported social networks in a way that contributes towards incremental social innovation through 
the fulfilment of pre-defined policy objectives. 
Table G.1: Social Innovation Dynamics in the Social Grid Model 
 
Source: (Nicholls and Ziegler, 2014) 
D1.1 Chapter 2 CRESSI Working Paper 2 (18.12.2014) Page 10 | 13 
 
 
 
Type of Effect Objective 
Incremental To fill gaps in the provision of social 
goods; improve the efficiency of 
provision 
Structural To rearrange institutions and 
networks for social goods 
Disruptive To change cognitive frames, social 
networks and/or institutions 
 
Table 1: Typology of Effects of Social Innovation 
 
Thi  typology reminds us th t social innovation comes in many forms and has a range of effects
13
. 
The implications of social innovation will therefore be different across a social grid. Incremental 
innovation is likely to engage with specific failures in the provision of social goods at the grass-
roots level, tructural i nov ion rearrange power relations and s cial structures, and disruptive 
innovation replaces entire cognitive frames and institutions thereby reconfiguring the respective 
social grid. 
 
With respect to Beckert’s Social Grid Model, it is also important to understand how social 
innovation can play a role in changing – or disrupting – the relationships between the three forces of 
his Social Grid Model (Scheuerle, Schimpf and Mildenberger 2014). There are six such dynamic 
relationships in the Social Grid Model (see Table 2). Between institutions and social networks, the 
former can influence the structure of social networks, whilst the latter can establish collective power 
to shape institutions. Between institutions and cognitive frames, the former can make values 
socially relevant f r the latter, whil t the latter provides legitimation and c n shape th  wider 
perceptions of institutions. Finally, between social networks and cognitive frames, the former can 
shape and diffuse cognitive frames whilst the latter can shape perceptions of network structures. Of 
course, as mentioned above, social innovation also occurs within the social forces themselves and 
across the power structures set out by Mann. 
 
Social Force Dynamic Effect Social Innovation (Example) 
Institutions Influence the structure of 
social networks 
Build bridging social capital 
Make values socially relevant 
for cognitive frames 
Influence regulatory norms 
Social Networks Establish collective power to 
shape institutions 
Increase political mobilization 
Shape and diffuse cognitive 
frames 
Deepen focused activism 
Cognitive Frames Provide legitimation and shape 
the wider perceptions of 
institutions 
Build a social movement for 
change 
Shape perceptions of network 
structures 
Change value perceptions of 
cultural material 
 
Table 2: Social Innovation Dynamics in the Social Grid Model 
 
Social innovation discourse has very much focused on innovation not just “for”, but also “with” 
citizens. In terms of our evaluative focus on human capabilities, this implies that we ought to think 
                                                          
13
 The typology of social innovation will be further discussed in CRESSI Project Work Package 3 (WP3) in relation to 
the rich tradition of research on technological innovation.  
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There has been a long-standing interest in the development of the social economy and the 
opportunities this presents for democratic and social renewal through political mobilisation and 
civic engagement that tackles marginality (Evers and Laville, 2004; Pestoff, 2008). Ayob et al. 
(2016) draw a distinction between weak, utilitarian approaches that focus on the aggregate social 
value of innovations (Mulgan et al., 2007; Phills, 2008) and stronger interpretations that centre on 
the radical practice of collaborative action to restructure existing power relations leading to the 
social inclusion of marginalised groups (Moulaert et al., 2005; Moulaert et al., 2010). Ayob et al. 
(2016: 649) suggest that this latter approach bears a strong resemblance to co-production, aligning 
around common themes of empowerment, societal change and collaboration.  
Whilst more radical conceptions of social innovation have been partially adopted through the 
principle of co-production in social policymaking, these initiatives have, on the whole, been rather 
perfunctory and superficial. Within European social innovation policy, there has been little, if any, 
regulatory or financial support given to social networks that strengthen the collective political 
power of marginalised populations. Without these political networks of action, disadvantaged 
individuals and communities have little power to shape dominant institutions and cognitive frames 
that so profoundly affect the extent and character of social exclusion. A series of measures do 
encourage the incorporation of marginalised views and experiences into the policymaking process, 
but the agenda setting and decision-making centre remains largely unchanged in terms of the 
solutions to marginalisation deemed appropriate and necessary. If public policymaking in Europe 
continues to neglect the political mobilisation of those most negatively affected by structural 
inequalities (of power, resource and opportunity), social innovation is unlikely to fulfil its 
transformative promise. As demonstrated in CRESSI research on social innovation, policy measures 
that stifle effective social and community development, struggle to support marginalised 
populations to shape and diffuse the cognitive frames and institutions that structure marginalisation 
(Edmiston and Aro, 2016). Not only does this constrain social innovation as a transversal policy 
mechanism, it also limits it potential as a nested policy paradigm that seeks to contribute towards 
more modest, incremental change.  
According to Mann (2013: 1), power entails the ‘capacity to get others to do things that otherwise 
they otherwise would not do’. In this regard, a transference or realignment of power towards the 
powerless is central to the political project of social innovation in Europe. Without it, social 
innovation policymaking garners and gives credence to a conciliatory politics of need provision that 
focuses on ‘pragmatic solutions’ to ‘political problems’ regarding the redistribution of resource, 
power and opportunity. Within such a setting, social innovation policy runs the risk of de-
politicising the causes of and solutions to marginalisation.   
At present, there is broad recognition in social innovation policy of the limitations and deficits 
arising from the existing socio-political and economic configuration. This is put towards a variety 
of different ends that have a number of positive social and economic outcomes for some of the most 
marginalised and disempowered citizens in Europe. However there is nonetheless a political 
disinclination to identify and address the specific actors, institutions and processes that prove so 
fundamental to the structuration of disadvantage at the macro-level. The diffuse, complex and 
dynamic operation of power is often poorly conceptualised in social innovation policymaking. 
Whilst the disadvantageous features of the social/market economy are widely acknowledged and 
seen as a motivation for supporting social innovation, the power relations comprised in this are 
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poorly understood or accounted for in policy instruments designed to tackle marginalisation. The 
failure of EU and domestic public policies to acknowledge or attend to this, limits the potential of 
social innovation to its pragmatic means i.e. effectiveness and efficiency. Equally, social innovation 
policymaking sidesteps the problematic material and symbolic significance of power, including its 
impact on the forms of inclusion and exclusion it produces. This constrains the potential of social 
innovation policy in its capacity to critique, contest and disrupt existing power relations. In doing 
so, social innovation policy fails to problematize the social structuration of disadvantage, at least in 
a way that is willing to identify and displace institutional dominance and sites of power.  
In this respect, the apolitical nature of social innovation policy is both a vice and virtue in the 
political economy of welfare and marginalisation. On the one hand, the neutral framing of social 
innovation in public policy dissuades questions concerning culpability, accountability and 
responsibility regarding marginalisation. For example, questions such as: who is responsible for 
rising levels of poverty and inequality? How should they be held to account? And what role can the 
market economy play in contributing towards inclusive growth going forward? Institutional neglect 
of these questions essentially dissimulates political choices surrounding social innovation in the 
policymaking process (Grisolia and Ferragina, 2015: 167). On the other hand, the apolitical nature 
of social innovation policy makes it possible to accommodate a plurality of social, political and 
economic interests in mobilising resources and action (albeit remedial) to tackle marginalisation. 
The multiple framing of and pursuit of social innovation in public policy, makes it possible to 
encourage collective action for a particular outcome or activity, but this equally detracts from 
mobilising resources and individuals against the structural determinants of exclusion. For some, this 
may not present a practical or principled challenge to its efficacy. To the contrary, Ziegler (2015) 
suggests that a focus on contestation may actually obscure complementarities between differing 
approaches to social innovation, which may in turn, stifle the incremental advancement of its utility 
in value deliberations concerning social justice. However, the collaborative framing of social 
innovation (both in policy and practice) does present a number of risks. If utility maximising 
approaches are understood as complementary to, or perhaps not in conflict with, more radical 
approaches to social innovation, this runs the risk of presenting both approaches as compatible or 
mutually conceivable. As demonstrated in the case of EU social innovation policy, this is not the 
case, with the former superseding and providing grounds to delegitimise the latter. In this respect, 
EU social innovation policy can be understood as having ‘inherently political dimensions’ (Ayob et 
al., 2016: 649), that function to de-politicise the causes, effects and solutions to marginalisation. 
‘Innovative’ solutions are presented that not only fail to unsettle, but actually serve to consolidate, 
the prevailing political economy of inequality across and within EU member states.  
As a result, the political agency and subjectivity of marginalised individuals is often overlooked in 
social innovation policymaking; as is their capacity to resist the institutions, ideals and processes 
that shape and constrain their capacity to define and pursue their ends. Going forward, it seems that 
the political subjectivity and collective action of marginalised groups is a key resource for ensuring 
social innovation policy is able to tackle the structural determinants of marginalisation and thereby 
contribute towards systemic and ‘positive’ social change (cf. Dey and Steyaert, 2016). This presents 
a particular challenge for public policy in trying to overcome the paradox of embedded agency that 
characterises both institutional entrepreneurship and social innovation (Garud et al., 2007).  
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Existing research on social innovation policy suggests the majority of activities and initiatives 
supported through EU and domestic institutions tend to be small, localised and short-term. In many 
cases, projects are ‘either discontinued after a few years, or faced an uncertain future in the short 
term’ (Brandsen, 2014: 9). In addition, research indicates that the activities supported are 
numerable, but diffuse: ‘characterised in almost all its fields by a multitude of small operators and 
initiatives rather than by a small number of big players (Terstriep et al., 2015: 80). This has been 
variously explained by the poor level of infrastructure for social economy organisations, the high 
level of reliance on project-based funding and dependence on institutional support that is subject to 
political fashions (Brandsen, 2014). One possible solution to addressing the apolitical nature of 
social innovation policymaking, and scaling the capacity and impact of projects funded through 
public institutions would be to foster a greater degree of collective identification and political action 
amongst marginalised populations.  
At present, many social innovation policies seek to improve the human capabilities and 
empowerment of marginalised individuals through localised and collective action. These measures 
tend to focus on acts of self-organisation that develop individual and collective competencies to 
improve outcomes and affect (confined) change in the socio-material, rather than socio-political, 
position of marginalised communities. Whilst these measures have the potential to create new 
mechanisms and platforms of collective need provision, they also ‘may shift questions of welfare 
away from that of fulfilling social rights to how most effectively to deliver collective needs’ (Endo 
and Lim, 2016: 12). To effectively scale social innovation and resist the instrumentalisation of need 
provision, public policies must move beyond diffuse, isolated instances of self-organisation and 
empowerment.  
To foster systemic social innovation, public policies must engender collective identification 
amongst marginalised individuals so that they are able to identify how their individual 
disadvantages are shared and connected to broader regimes of production, consumption, inequality, 
welfare and power. In doing so, it would be possible to foster collective material and post-material 
transformations that effectively resource and politicise social innovation as a policy concept. This 
would advance a social innovation paradigm that entails collective action for measures that seek to 
fulfil human capabilities and social needs. However, it would also encourage measures that venerate 
and foster collective action against those institutions, networks and cognitive frames that structure 
social disadvantage (Dey and Teasdale, 2013cf. ). Without a policy approach that offers systemic 
solutions to overcoming marginality (through problematizing its structuration), social innovation 
policy runs the risk of being co-opted as another tool of oppression that distracts from, and thereby 
legitimises persistent inequalities of resource, power and opportunity.  
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